Domain Specific Roles¶
Extended the concept of Implied Roles to allow the prior role to be domain-specific, allowing a domain administrator to create roles that are meaningful to their users. These roles are just management roles, and expand out into their implied roles for token purposes.
The existing definition of a role is a direct link to the policy rules, i.e. the role name is the item that is referenced directly from policy. This will be referred to as a “policy role” in this blueprint.
The Implied Roles specification creates the ability where a prior role can be defined that expands out into a set of implied roles at token validation time. Both the prior role and all the implied roles end up in the token - i.e. all of them are policy roles.
Policy files that reference policy roles are, and should be, tightly controlled in any cloud. An error in one of these files could be very damaging. As such, they are not likely to be changed too often. The modeling of a set of human-understandable roles that might be given to users, however, may change quite often. In public clouds (or multi-customer clouds in general), for instance, the cloud provider will most likely publish their “role model”, listing what roles customer admins should assign their users to be able to issue given APIs. In order to service the greatest number of differing customers, this role model is likely to become much more granular than it is today (since, of course, the role model is common to all their customers).
For a specific customer, however, it is unlikely that whatever set of granular roles a cloud provider chooses will be meaningful or represent a relevant grouping of roles that will suit their particular usage model. Ideally a domain administrator would want to create roles that are meaningful to the particular users of that domain and somehow map these onto the role model defined by the cloud provider. These domain-specific roles would be private to their domain and exist only in that domain’s namespace, since they may make no sense to users in other domains. Furthermore these domain-specific roles should not show up in any tokens - only the roles that they map to (which are policy roles that are part of the cloud provider’s roles model) should appear in tokens.
The Implied Roles capability provides the mapping described above, with the domain specific role being a prior role. However, as currently described, it requires that prior roles are global in scope (i.e. not private to the domain) and that prior roles are also inserted into the token, hence the above is not possible.
It is proposed that we build on Implied Roles capability to allow the creation of domain specific prior roles. Domain specific prior roles (which are simply role entities with a new domain_id attribute) can be used to define implied roles (i.e. by implying a set of policy roles), with the only difference being (compared to a regular prior role) that when the effective roles are calculated for the token, the domain specific prior role itself will not be included.
A domain specific role can be used (in terms of assignment APIs) everywhere that a global role can be used today. Given that at token generation, domain specific roles will be expanded into their policy roles, there will be no impact on services outside of Keystone (and no change to policy files). For fernet tokens (which don’t contain the roles anyway), they will be expanded at token validation time. Furthermore, domain specific roles can be used with federation, allowing any of the attested users from IdPs, that are trusted by the domain, to gain domain specific role assignments via the existing federated mapping to Keystone groups.
The domain_id attribute of a role is immutable, you can’t flip a role between being global and domain specific.
Provide the ability to have domain-specific policy files. This would be a very complex undertaking.
Data Model Impact¶
For SQL, the roles table will be expanded to support domain specific roles.
REST API Impact¶
Modifications to the role API to allow creation of domain specific roles.
Any change to the role or policy model has the potential to affect security. The proposal doesn’t, however, significantly increase the attack vectors, since in essence it is simply providing a more convenient alternative to manually adding a set of existing global policy roles to users.
Any existing notification regarding roles will be extended to include domain specific roles.
Other End User Impact¶
The main impact would be at token generation and validation time, but this will be not different to that of implied roles in general.
Other Deployer Impact¶
- Primary assignee:
Add manager/driver support for domain specific roles
Add controller for domain specific roles
Add keystoneclient library support for domain specific roles
Add openstack cli support for domain specific roles
Changes to user documentation to describe new API.