At the Newton summit in Austin, several related questions about how deployers solve real world problems with automation kept appearing in loosely related conversations:

• How are federated users bootstrapped into the cloud with some amount of useful authorization?
• How do federated users receive role assignments?
• Federation or not, how do deployers create “personal projects” for new users? How are new users assigned default projects?

Today, deployers have to answer these questions by implementing external orchestration tools which either preemptively populate keystone with authorization data in bulk, or intervene during the authentication process to do so only when necessary.

With the introduction of shadow users in the Mitaka release, Keystone is now capable of persisting local identities to reflect remote users, thus opening the door for locally-managed role assignments rather than just ephemeral group memberships. The next logical step is to extend that capability to handle the other pieces of the authorization puzzle: projects, roles, role assignments, and default projects.

## Problem Description¶

A shadow user is created only after a successful authentication attempt. Therefore, a federated user would have to attempt to authenticate before an administrator could assign roles directly to their shadowed identity, resulting in a strange user experience. Granted, we do have the capability to manage authorization on user groups ahead of time, user groups are simply not a flexible enough solution to cover everyone’s use cases. For example, how do we “map” new user into a personal project (a user-specific tenancy), assign the user a “member” role on that project, and make it the user’s default project for subsequent authentication attempts?

## Proposed Change¶

The mapping engine is responsible for mapping federated attributes into local ones. Today, it’s essentially capable of determining a user’s name and group memberships. This change proposes to also “map” users into local projects and roles, with local role assignments, which may or may not exist at the time of authentication.

For example, if a project name is referenced in the mapping, it may need to be automatically created prior to assigning the user a “member” role on it.

The following is an example of what the mapping engine supports today:

PUT /OS-FEDERATION/mappings/{mapping_id}
{
"mapping": {
"rules": [
{
"local": [
{
"user": {
"name": "{0}"
}
},
{
"group": {
"id": "0cd5e9"
}
}
],
"remote": [
{
},
{
"type": "orgPersonType",
"not_any_of": [
"Contractor",
"Guest"
]
}
]
}
]
}
}


The following is an example of what the mapping engine might support as a result of this spec:

PUT /OS-FEDERATION/mappings/{mapping_id}
{
"mapping": {
"rules": [
{
"remote": [
{
},
{
"type": "orgPersonType",
"not_any_of": [
"Contractor",
"Guest"
]
}
],
"local": [
{
"user": {
"name": "{0}"
}
},
{
"projects": [
{
"name": "Development project for {0}",
"roles": [
{
}
]
},
{
"name": "Staging",
"roles": [
{
"name": "member"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Production",
"roles": [
{
"name": "observer"
}
]
},
]
}
]
}
]
}
}


The above example is constructed with the following considerations in mind:

• The mapping explicitly references a domain_id, which applies to all objects in the mapping schema (users, projects, and possibly even roles). This would allow a domain administrator to control a mapping, without requiring intervention from the cloud operator. It is implied that the domain_id comes from the Identity Provider, which is a one-to-one relationship with a domain. There is work underway in the Ocata release to map existing Identity Providers to a domain.
• The mapping refers to multiple projects, each with a unique set of role references. This implies that the user has those role assignments on each of the respective projects.
• Each project name (and possibly ID) may be determined dynamically based on remote assertions. If any of those projects do not exist, they must be created by Keystone automatically. Since the dynamic values come from the assertion, it is safe to assume they only need to be created once.
• The user’s default_project_id attribute could be automatically set to the first project that appears in the list. This could also be something that is added at a later time. Initially it wouldn’t be a requirement for a user’s default_project_id to be set.
• The roles within the projects should be expected to already exist. The current workflow for adding new roles to a deployment involves not only creating them in keystone, but also might require changes to various policy files across the deployment (and other services). Creating roles on-the-fly during a federated authentication could lead unusable projects if other services don’t have the required policy in place.

So, in this example, let’s say that the remote UserName attribute is simply “Joe”. According to the mapping, if Joe is neither a guest nor contractor, he would:

1. Receive a shadowed user identity, with a username of “Joe”, in the domain with an ID of “ab4e2e”.
2. Receive a project-scoped “admin” role on a new project (created automatically) named “Development project for Joe” in the “ab4e2e” domain.
3. Joe’s default_project_id would be set to the ID of the “Development project for Joe”.
4. Receive direct user + project + role assignments on three projects, with three different roles.
5. Receive a project-scoped token (instead of an unscoped token, as federated users receive today), scoped to the user’s default project. This reflects the auth behavior of local keystone users.

Finally, it’s worth mentioning that if the mapping were to change between federated authentications with keystone, the result of the new mapping would simply be applied without any additional side effects. Any reduction in authorization implied by a change in mapping would need to be handled out of band, as Keystone would have no way of tracking what authorization was granted as a result of a mapping versus any other means. However, normal token revocation behaviors would still apply to the role assignments created by a mapping (so you could still change a mapping, delete a project created by a mapping, and expect tokens to be revoked for that project).

### Alternatives¶

One alternative is to have external orchestration tools ask keystone to predict user identities, and preemptively populate Keystone with appropriate authorization data before the user attempts to authenticate. This makes several assumptions and places additional design constraints on Keystone:

1. The operator is assuming that the user will successfully authenticate at some point in the future, thus making the prepopulated authorization data relevant and useful.
2. The mapping must be defined as it was when the operator queried for the result of the mapping as when the user finally authenticates.
3. Shadow user IDs must ultimately be repeatable (either predictable or persistent) rather than just arbitrary UUIDs lazily assigned during authentication.
4. We must assume that operators are willing to (continue to) implement such external orchestration tools. This may be acceptable for large deployments, but is an impractical barrier for smaller ones.

### Security Impact¶

The mapping engine already has a relatively high impact on keystone’s security model, as it is a relatively complex and essentially dynamic source of user identity and authorization management. That complexity will only increase as the mapping engine is extended to handle additional capabilities around authorization management. Deployers should carefully consider their security policy around the mapping API itself.

We may also need to consider implement additional constraints over what what domains the mapping engine can interact with, what projects can be created, what roles can be assigned, etc.

This has the potential to cause a lot of notification traffic when users are first authenticated, as a large number of resources may be allocated at once. The same would be true if an external tool were to create the same resources, however.

### Other End User Impact¶

First time users will have a much smoother experience going through the federated authenticating flow, without requiring significant, external effort on the part of operators.

### Performance Impact¶

For new users requiring a large number of resources to be allocated during their first authentication, performance of that call will certainly suffer, as the resources will be created synchronously. Aggressive client-side timeouts (for example, in Horizon) may result in false-positive authentication failures.

### Other Deployer Impact¶

Defining mapping rules will ultimately be far more complicated, but the trade-off is that deployers will not have to manage custom tooling on top of keystone.

None.

## Implementation¶

### Assignee(s)¶

Primary assignee:

• Ron De Rose (rderose)

### Work Items¶

1. Extend the mapping engine’s JSON schema to support projects, role assignments, and default projects.
2. Handle the additional output of the mapping engine to create and assign resources as required.
3. Thoroughly document the behavior of the mapping engine with existing mapping engine documentation.

None.

## Documentation Impact¶

The additional complexity of the mapping engine will require significant effort to comprehensively document.