Image Encryption and Decryption¶
OpenStack already has the ability to create encrypted volumes and ephemeral storage to ensure the confidentiality of block data. In contrast to that, images are currently handled without protection towards confidentiality, only providing the possibility to ensure integrity using image signatures. For further protection of user data - e.g. when a user uploads an image containing private data or confidential information - the image data should not be accessible for unauthorized entities. For this purpose, an encrypted image format is to be introduced in OpenStack.
To enable this, several adjustments to support image encryption/decryption in various projects, e.g. Nova, Glance, Cinder and OSC, need to be implemented.
The proposal documented in this spec describes the Cinder-related part of the overall cross-project concept for image encryption.
An image, when uploaded to Glance or being created through Nova from an existing server (VM), may contain sensitive information. The already provided signature functionality only protects images against alteration. Images may be stored on several hosts over long periods of time. First and foremost this includes the image storage hosts of Glance itself. Furthermore it might also involve other systems such as volume hosts. As a result they are exposed to a multitude of potential scenarios involving different hosts with different access patterns and attack surfaces. The OpenStack components involved in those scenarios – including Cinder - do not protect the confidentiality of image data.
Using encrypted storage backends for volume and compute hosts in conjunction with direct data transfer from/to encrypted images can enable workflows that never expose an image’s data on a host’s filesystem. Storage of encryption keys on a dedicated key manager host ensures isolation and access control for the keys as well. With such a set of configuration recommendations for security focused environments, we are able to reach a good foundation. Future enhancements can build upon that and extend the provided security enhancements to a broader set of variants.
That’s why we propose the introduction of an encrypted image format.
1. A user wants to create a new volume based on an encrypted image. The corresponding volume host has to be able to decrypt the image using the symmetric key stored in the key manager and transform it into the requested volume resource.
2.1. A user wants to create an encrypted image from a volume. The volume does not use an encrypted volume type. The target image is to be encrypted using the proposed image encryption mechanism and a specified key.
2.2. A user wants to create an encrypted image from a volume. The volume uses an encrypted volume type (LUKS-based). The target image is not to be re-encrypted but will instead reuse the LUKS encryption and key. This use case is already implemented as part of the default behavior of Cinder.
2.3. A user wants to create an encrypted image from a volume. The volume uses an encrypted volume type (LUKS-based). The target image is to be re-encrypted using the proposed image encryption mechanism and a specified key. This involves opening a dmcrypt mapping for the LUKS encryption and streaming the plain data of the volume directly into the target image file while encrypting it using the specified image encryption mechanism (e.g. GPG).
In Glance we propose to add a new container_format called ‘encrypted’. Furthermore, we propose the following additional metadata properties carried by images of this format:
‘os_encrypt_format’ - the main mechanism used, e.g. ‘GPG’
‘os_encrypt_type’ - encryption type, e.g. ‘symmetric’
‘os_encrypt_cipher’ - the cipher algorithm, e.g. ‘AES256’
‘os_encrypt_key_id’ - reference to key in the key manager
‘os_decrypt_container_format’ - format after payload decryption
‘os_decrypt_size’ - size after payload decryption
All these metadata properties are only used for the decryption of an image and won’t be needed in the lifecycle of a volume anymore. When creating an image from a volume these metadata properties are newly generated and saved in the Glance metadata of the new image.
For Cinder we want to add support for encrypted image decryption when a volume is created from it. Cinder should select a suitable decryption mechanism according to the new image container_format and metadata. The symmetric key will be retrieved from the key manager (e.g. Barbican) according to the key id stored in the metadata. Additionally, Cinder should be able to encrypt volume data in a similar fashion if the user requests an encrypted image to be created from a volume according to the use cases 2.1 and 2.3 illustrated above.
The implementations in Cinder should make use of a centralized encryption implementation provided by a global library, shared between all involved OpenStack components to prevent individual implementations of the encryption mechanism.
For general image encryption, we propose to use an implementation of symmetric AES 256 provided by GnuPG as a basic mechanism supported by this draft. It is a well established implementation of PGP and supports streamable encryption/decryption processes, which is important as we require the streamability of the encryption/decryption mechanism for two reasons:
Loading entire images into the memory of volume hosts is unacceptable.
We propose direct decryption-streaming into the target volume to prevent the creation of temporary unencrypted files.
There is already one existing case in Cinder’s current implementation where encrypted images are created (use case 2.2). This is when an image is created directly from an encrypted volume. Since the encrypted block data is simply copied into the image, the encryption (usually LUKS) is automatically inherited - as is the encryption key, which is simply cloned in Barbican. We will not change this behavior as a part of this spec. Our changes will only apply, when the user actively wants to create an encrypted image from any volume.
The key management is handled differently than with encrypted volumes or encrypted ephemeral storage. The reason for this is, that the encryption and decryption of an image will never happen in Glance but in all other services, which consume images. Therefore the service which needs to create a key for a newly created encrypted image may not be the same service which then has to delete the key (in most cases Glance). To delete a key, which has not been created by the same entity, is bad behavior. To avoid this, we choose to let the user create and delete the key. To not accidently delete a key, which is used to encrypt an image, we will let Glance register as a consumer of that key (secret in Barbican ) when the corresponding encrypted image is uploaded and unregister as a consumer when the image is deleted in Glance.
The methods for encryption and decryption of files - in this case images - will be written in a driver like manner in os-brick so the image encryption can be extended with another encryption format easily. The encryption driver should focus a specific encryption format and implement exactly one encrypt and one decrypt method, both based on a cipher implementation of GPG aes. This driver may be simple wrappers around an existing implementation. An abstract base class should be defined and be used for the implementation of GPG encryption (and might be used for other implementations in the future).
Regarding the image encryption, we also explored the possibility of using more elaborate and dynamic approaches like PKCS#7 (CMS) but ultimately failed to find a free open-source implementation (e.g. OpenSSL) that supports streamable decryption of CMS-wrapped encrypted data. More precisely, no implementation we tested was able to decrypt a symmetrically encrypted, CMS-wrapped container without trying to completely load it into memory or suffering from other limitations regarding big files.
We also evaluated an image encryption implementation based on LUKS which is already used in Cinder and Nova as an encryption mechanism for volumes and ephemeral disks respectively. However, we were unable to find a suitable solution to directly handle file-based LUKS encryption in user space. Firstly, the handling of LUKS devices (even when file-based) via cryptsetup always requires the dm-crypt kernel module and corresponding root privileges. Secondly, in contrast to native LUKS used by LibVirt, the LUKS handling available via cryptsetup creates temporary device mapper endpoints where data is read from or written to. There is no direct reading/writing from/to an encrypted LUKS file and LUKS opening/closing needs to be handled accordingly. Lastly, LUKS is a format primarily designed for disk encryption. Although it may be used for files as well (by formatting files as LUKS devices), the handling is rather inconvenient; for example, the size of the LUKS container file needs to be calculated and allocated beforehand since it acts like a disk with a fixed size.
Data model impact¶
REST API impact¶
For creating encrypted images from volumes, additional properties in the request body of “os-volume_upload_image” will need to be introduced to specify the desired encryption format and key id.
There are impacts on the security of OpenStack:
confidentiality of data in images will be addressed in this spec
image encryption is introduced, thus additional cryptographic algorithms will be used in Cinder to implement this functionality
Other end user impact¶
Users should be able to optionally, but knowingly create a differently encrypted image from a volume.
If an administrator has configured Glance to reject unencrypted images, such images will not be accepted when attempted to be uploaded to Glance.
The proposed encryption/decryption mechanisms in Cinder will only be utilized on-demand and skipped entirely for image container types that aren’t encrypted.
Thus, any performance impact is only applicable to the newly introduced encrypted image type where the processing (or creation) of such image will have increased computational costs and longer processing times than for regular images. Impact will vary depending on the individual host performance and supported CPU extensions for cipher algorithms.
For Ceph-based setups, the usual cloning performance benefit provided by the shared storage between Glance and Cinder is lost for encrypted images, due to the need of converting the encrypted image data format to the volume format.
Other deployer impact¶
A key manager - like Barbican - is required.
The key manager needs to be accessible from volume hosts, requiring appropriate cinder.conf adjustments.
To use the encoding and decoding of images in os-brick, we need to execute priviledged functions. We decided to use privsep for this as in nova.
- Primary assignee:
Markus Hentsch (IRC: mhen)
- Other contributors:
Josephine Seifert (IRC: Luzi)
Add a decryption implementation in Cinder for creating volumes from GPG encrypted images
Add a dedicated encryption workflow and implementation in Cinder for creating encrypted images from volumes using the proposed image encryption format (GPG)
Add encryption and decryption methods for the GPG format in os-brick
GPG is required to be installed on all systems that are required to perform encryption/decryption operations in order to support the proposed base encryption mechanism.
This spec requires the implementation of an encrypted container_format and corresponding metadata property support in Glance
This spec requires the implementation of appropriate encryption/decryption functionality in a global library shared between the components involved in image encryption workflows (Nova, Cinder, OSC), like os-brick
Tempest tests would require access to encrypted images for testing. This means that Tempest either needs to be provided with an image file that is already encrypted and its corresponding key or needs to be able to encrypt images itself. This point is still open for discussion.
It should be documented for deployers, how to enable this feature in the OpenStack configuration. An end user should have a documentation on how to use encrypted images in Cinder and how to create them respectively. Furthermore, any resulting limitations such as reduced performance should be mentioned, especially for Ceph-based setups usually benefiting from shared storage cloning.
 Barbican Secret Consumer Spec: https://review.opendev.org/#/c/662013/