Explicit Domain IDs

Explicit Domain IDs

Explicit Domain IDs

Problem Description

Many organizations are deploying multiple OpenStack deployments. There are many reasons that these systems are not shared into on large cluster. Some are owned by different sub organizations. Others are kept separate due to application life cycle. Some are physically isolated from each other. All of these issues prevent co-operation across clusters.

If the organization uses LDAP for the user backend, the user entry in the id_mapping table gets a new local_id generated as a hash of the domain_id and the unique Identifier from the LDAP server. If the Domain ID is different in two different deployments, the user ends up with two distinct user IDs. An attempt to build an Audit train across multiple deployments then has to correlate the user IDs across different Keystone servers.

To avoid this, operators want to keep the LDAP users in a domain with a consistent ID across deployments. The only domain with a predictable ID, however, is default. The default domain is used during the initial install, and thus has service users. Thus, it is impractical to put the LDAP users in the default domain. If a site wished to have two LDAP servers in domain specific backends, only one could be put in default.

Today, if a deployer desires to keep two Keystone servers in sync while avoiding Database replication, they must hack the database to update the Domain ID so that entries match. Domain ID is then used for LDAP mapped IDs, and if they don’t match, the user IDs are different. It should be possible to add a domain with an explicit ID, so that the two servers can match User IDs.

An additional effort is underway to make the Federated Identity sources use the same mechanism as LDAP. This effort is hampered by the same domain_id restrictions as LDAP.

Making the identifiers consistent across multiple deployments will aid in several use cases:

It will make it easier to synchronize role assignments across two distinct deployments, as the user ID from the first can be used in the second.

Applications will now be able to predict what user-id a user would have in a cluster, even before that user visits the cluster. This allows the system to pre-create user records, and have them link to the identity source when the user does finally authenticate to the Keystone server.

One structure that can be used for multiple deployments is for each Keystone server to represent a different region, and for each region to have a set of domains for which it is the system of record. This allows local writes and avoids conflicts. In order for a central system to keep track of the domain IDs, and to synchronize them across different servers, one of the systems needs to be able to explicitly assign them.

Proposed Change

When creating a domain, the user can pass the optional parameter explicit_domain_id to be used when creating the domain. A domain created this way will not use an auto-generated ID, but will use the id passed in instead.

Identifiers passed in this way must conform to the existing ID generation scheme: UUID4 without dashes. Note that this API will only be accessible via system membership, restricting it to deployment administrators and operators.

Alternatives

Galera Sync of the database between sites. This will only scale to a small number of locations. With local HA requirements of 3 nodes per site, this will likely scale to a single digit number of locations.

Make Domain names immutable and change the scheme to use the names. This will break all the existing LDAP deployments, as well as break API backwards compatibility.

K2K Federation has been discussed as a way to help manage multiple sites, but it does not address the need to make the User ID consistent for Audit purposes. In addition, K2K adds an additional layer of SAML indirection, without providing additional value here: it solves the problem where users are stored in one Keystone server, but need access to a separate cloud. As such, K2K will suffer from all the same problems as any of Federated Identity Provider.

Security Impact

This should have little to no direct security impact. It will, however, greatly aid in auditability, as user IDs can be correlated across multiple deployments.

There is little risk of a domain administrator abusing this new option. Creating a Domain is a rare operation, reserved for Cloud Admins. As such, they are keeping domain IDs in sync to aid their own organizational goals. If they chose to not sync a domain, it will only affect their own cluster, and not the others. The degenerate case for Auditing will be the current state.

The IDs for users will now fall into the category of “predictable-but-not-settable.” Since the uuid is a hash of the string, and not explicitly setable, the will not be a potential for “User_ID squatting.” where a user pre-allocates an entry to block another user.

Notifications Impact

None

Other End User Impact

None

Performance Impact

None

Other Deployer Impact

None

Developer Impact

None

Implementation

Assignee(s)

Primary assignee:

  • Adam Young <ayoung>

Work Items

Change to Keystone Server Change to Openstack SDK Change to OpenStack CLI

Dependencies

None

Documentation Impact

New option needs to be in documentation, including an update to the LDAP and Federation docs.

References

None

Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License

Except where otherwise noted, this document is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. See all OpenStack Legal Documents.

identity-specs